Case Reference: 3234070

Costs Decision
Inquiry Held on 16 - 19 March 2021
Site visit made on 25 March 2021
by Andrew Dawe BSc(Hons) MSc MPhil MRTPI
an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State
Decision date: 24th June 2021
Costs application in relation to Appeal Ref: APP/F2360/W/19/3234070
Land to the South of Chain House Lane, Whitestake, Preston
• The application is made under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, sections 78,
320 and Schedule 6, and the Local Government Act 1972, section 250(5).
• The application is made by [APPELLANT] for a partial award of costs
against South Ribble Borough Council.
• The inquiry was in connection with an appeal against the refusal of planning permission
for Outline Planning Permission for up to 100 dwellings with access and associated
works.
• This decision supersedes that issued on 13 December 2019. That decision on the appeal
was quashed by order of the High Court.
Decision
1. The application for an award of costs is refused.
Procedural Matters
2. I have taken into account the Government’s Planning Practice Guidance (PPG),
in reaching my decision.
3. For clarity, in my reasons I shall refer to the previous decision relating to the
fourth bullet point of the above header as the quashed decision, and to the
High Court order as the HC Judgement.
The submissions for [APPELLANT]
4. The aims of the costs regime include –
i) to encourage all those in the appeal process to behave in a reasonable
way and follow good practice in the presentation of full and detailed
evidence to support their case, and
ii) to encourage local planning authorities to properly exercise their
development management responsibilities, to rely only on reasons for
refusal which stand up to scrutiny on the planning merits of the case,
and not to add to development costs through avoidable delay – NPPG
16-028.
5. The application for costs and the relevant guidance must be considered with
these important aims in mind. The local planning authority (LPA) in this case
has failed in each respect to comply with these underlying aims.
6. The NPPG provides examples of unreasonable behaviour. It is important to
keep in mind that these are merely examples, it is not necessary to come
within any particular example in order for an award of costs to be merited, it
remains important to consider any application against the underlying aims of
the regime.
7. Costs awards can be for the full costs of an appeal, or can be partial awards of
costs. PPG 16-040 and 16-041 provide guidance on this issue.
8. There are two outstanding reasons for refusal to be considered at the appeal.
The first reason is that “The application site is allocated as safeguarded land
through policy G3 of the South Ribble Local Plan. The proposal by virtue of its
nature, scale and degree of permanence would be contrary to policy G3 of the
South Ribble Local Plan as the Council can demonstrate a 5 year housing land
supply”. The reason for refusal is predicated upon the council being able to
demonstrate a 5 year housing land supply.
9. It is common ground at the forthcoming appeal that the relevant strategic
housing policy is Central Lancashire Core Strategy Policy 4 which was the
subject of a review in 2017 and found not to require updating. It is furthermore
common ground that the Council is unable to demonstrate a 5 years housing
supply if the figures from that policy are used.
10. The same policy applies in the neighbouring areas of Preston City Council and
Chorley Borough Council. The question of whether the figures from the Core
Strategy should continue to be used for the purposes of calculating 5 years
housing land supply was central to and fully argued at the recent appeal at
Cardwell Farm. Having heard the arguments the Inspector came to a very clear
decision that Core Strategy Policy 4 should be used for the purposes of
assessing whether there is a 5 years supply of housing land (decision letter
(DL) 40). Following that decision Chorley Borough Council has confirmed that
its position is that Core Strategy Policy 4 should be used for the purposes of
assessing 5 years housing land supply1.
11. A major part of the Council’s case has been the importance of determining
cases on a consistent basis, and the Council’s evidence highlighted the
significance of the anticipated decision on the Cardwell Farm appeal2. In the
light of the decision in that appeal it is clear that Core Strategy Policy 4 should
be used for the calculation of 5 years housing land supply and that accordingly
the Council is unable to identify a 5 years supply of housing land. This is
further emphasised by the importance attached by the Council in taking a
consistent approach throughout Central Lancashire3.
12. In the circumstances the Council’s position on its first reason for refusal is
unsustainable. This was brought to the Council’s attention in a letter dated
15th March 2021 and the Council was invited to concede on these issues in
order to save inquiry and unnecessary expense4.
13. The Council has not identified any reasonable grounds for maintaining its
position in the light of the Cardwell Farm decision. Its reliance upon a
misinterpretation of the judgment of Dove J does not assist (if anything it
1 Additional Document (AD) 11.2 paragraph 1.3
2 See for example Nick Ireland (NI) Proof of Evidence paragraphs 1.14 and 5.106
3 See for example NI paragraph 5.106
4 Document AD 11.1
exacerbates its position). The Council’s position with respect to MOU2 is the
same as that of Preston City Council (it maintains MOU2 is no longer in place5).
The document AD 10 does not materially advance the Council’s case. It is not a
meaningful review and did not involve a robust process – indeed it appears to
have been rushed through for the purposes of this inquiry.
14. The Council’s refusal to accede to the invitation to concede on the issue of 5
years housing land supply has required detailed consideration of these issues
which has resulted in the unnecessary prolongation of this inquiry. The majority
of the time taken at the inquiry involved consideration of the issue of 5 years
housing land supply which has been decisively determined by the Cardwell
Farm appeal. Maintenance of the first reason for refusal and the need to
consider these issues was clearly unreasonable in the light of the decision at
the Cardwell Farm inquiry. PPG 16-049 makes it clear that examples of
unreasonable conduct leading to an award of costs include persisting with
objections contrary to a previous decision of an Inspector and failing to
determine matters in a consistent manner.
15. In the circumstances the Appellant seeks a partial award of costs to cover the
costs incurred in addressing the first reason for refusal. This includes the costs
of calling Mr Pycroft and the increase in costs arising from the prolongation of
the inquiry to address the issue of 5 years housing land supply.
The response by South Ribble Borough Council
16. The Appellant has made a partial application for its costs from 15th March 2021,
in respect of the costs of addressing RFR 1 at the Public Inquiry (see
Appellant’s Cost Application (ACA) 12).
17. The application relies on a single point. It is claimed that it was unreasonable
(in the terms of the NPPG) for the LPA not to withdraw RFR 1, upon receipt of
the Inspector’s decision at Cardwell Farm (see especially ACA 7, 8, 10 and 11).
18. The LPA submit that the application is hopeless. It should not have been made.
The LPA defend the application in full and submit that it should be summarily
refused.
THE NATIONAL PLANNING PRACTICE GUIDANCE (NPPG)
19. This application is made with reference to the guidance contained in the NPPG
(Appeals). The NPPG provides updated guidance on the award of costs and is
designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning appeals
system. All paragraph references are to the NPPG (Appeals) unless otherwise
stated.
General Principles
20. In planning appeals, the parties involved normally meet their own expenses.
However, the cost awards’ regime seeks to increase the discipline of parties
when taking action within the planning system, through financial consequences
for those parties who have behaved unreasonably and have caused
unnecessary or wasted expense in the process. The LPA do not accept there
has been any “lack of discipline”. On the contrary, their case has been carefully
5 Document AD 10 paragraph 26
considered at each step of the Appeal process. Indeed, it was upheld in the first
Appeal and should be upheld again.
21. The costs regime is aimed at ensuring as far as possible that (so far as
relevant):6
• All those involved in the appeal process behave in an acceptable way and
are encouraged to follow good practice in the presentation of full and
detailed evidence to support their case;
• LPAs properly exercise their development management responsibilities,
relying only on reasons for refusal which stand up to scrutiny on the
planning merits of the case.
Conditions for an Award
22. The Planning Inspector has an unfettered discretion on whether to make an
award of costs. The Courts will not interfere except on public law grounds e.g.
where the grant/refusal of an application is Wednesbury unreasonable.
23. Costs “may” be awarded where:7
• The party against whom the award is sought has acted unreasonably; and
• The unreasonable behaviour has caused the party applying for costs to incur
unnecessary or wasted expense in the appeal process.
24. The word “unreasonable” is used in its ordinary meaning as established by the
Courts in Manchester City Council v. SoSE & Mercury Communications Ltd
[1998] JPL 774.8 This application relates to the substance of the LPA’s case on
RFR 1 (rather than the procedure).9
25. Further explanation (together with non-exhaustive examples) of unreasonable
behaviour by a LPA is set out in the NPPG. The following examples are relevant
(see paragraph 49):
• failure to produce evidence to substantiate each reason for refusal on
appeal;
• persisting in objections to a scheme or elements of a scheme which the SoS
or an Inspector has previously indicated to be acceptable;
• not determining similar cases in a consistent manner
26. The key test will be whether evidence is produced on appeal which provides a
respectable basis for the authority’s stance, in the light of a R v. SSE ex parte
North Norfolk DC [1994] 2 PLR 78.
THE LPA’S SUBMISSIONS
27. The essence of the Appellant’s claim is that the LPA has failed to produce on
appeal evidence which provides a respectable basis for RFR 1, contrary to the
NPPG and R v. SSE ex parte North Norfolk DC [1994] 2 PLR 78.
6 See para 028
7 Paragraph 31
8 See para 32
9 ibid
28. The LPA submit it is unanswerable that they have produced a respectable basis
for RFR 1. Indeed, the Appeal should be dismissed on the basis of RFR 1 (as
well as RFR 2).
29. The central issue in RFR 1, as Ben Pycroft (BP) expressly conceded, is whether
Policy 4(a) is out of date for the purposes of the 5YHLS calculation. That
requires the exercise of a planning judgment. In the light of the case law (see
Bloor Homes), that proposition is unanswerably correct.
30. Accordingly, the central dispute concerns the exercise of a planning judgment
on whether Policy 4(a) is out of date. That is a matter on which different
judgments may reasonably be reached by different people. Indeed, that cannot
reasonably be argued because it is precisely what Dove J held in Wainhomes
Ltd v SoS HCLG and South Ribble BC [2020] EWHC 2294 (Admin) [CD 7.1], in
a passage which is expressly relied upon by both parties:
45. … I am satisfied that the conclusion the Inspector reached in paragraph
37(iii), that there had been a significant change pursuant to the PPG arising
from the introduction of the standard method, was a planning judgment
reasonably open to her based upon a correct interpretation of the PPG (albeit
other conclusions might reasonably be reached by other Inspectors), and
therefore she was entitled to conclude that Core Strategy Policy 4(a) was out of
date.
31. At the heart of RFR 1, there is a difference of planning judgment on whether
Policy 4(a) is out of date. That is a disagreement on which different conclusions
might reasonably be reached. There is, therefore, no conceivable basis for an
adverse award of costs. It is noteworthy that the Appellant has failed (again) to
draw the Inspector’s attention to relevant parts of the Wainhomes judgment,
when it knew (or ought to know) that it is relevant to this application.
32. In particular, the LPA submit (in light of the above):
(i) It is not unreasonable for the LPA to exercise a different planning
judgment to the Cardwell Farm Inspector on the issue of whether
Policy 4(a) is out of date;
(ii) It is not unreasonable for the Inspector (in this case) to exercise a
different planning judgment to the Cardwell Farm Inspector on this
issue;
(iii) It is not, therefore, even arguably unreasonable for the LPA to seek
to persuade this Inspector to reach a different planning judgment to
the Cardwell Farm Inspector, especially given the multiple flaws in
that decision, which is to be challenged by Preston City Council in the
Planning Court;
(iv) Indeed, the Appellant is seeking to persuade the Inspector to reach a
different planning judgment to the first Inspector. The first Decision
Letter remains a material consideration (R (Davison) v Elmbridge
[2019] EWHC 1409 (Admin)). It is to that issue which para 45 of the
judgment is directed i.e. a subsequent Inspector can reasonably
reach a different planning judgment to a previous Inspector.
33. The Appellant does not suggest that there was not a respectable basis for
RFR 1. Rather, the sole issue is that the LPA’s position became unreasonable
once the Cardwell Farm DL was issued i.e. at that point there was no longer
any respectable basis for RFR 1. For the reasons set out above, that simply
cannot succeed. The decision maker can reach a different planning judgment
on whether Policy 4(a) is out of date (as Dove J has expressly held). This
application must, therefore, fail on this basis alone.
The Key Point
34. BP agreed there were two key issues under RFR 1:
(i) Whether the Inspector can lawfully consider whether policy 4 is out of
date, given the terms of NPPF 73 and fn 37?
(ii) If he can consider it: whether policy 4 is out of date, as a matter of
planning judgment?
35. The Appellant has sought to resile from the concession but it was clear and
unqualified. It is also correct. The Appellant’s case is contained in point (i). The
LPA’s case is point (ii). The concession merely confirms this unanswerable
proposition.
36. Point (i) is not in fact addressed or answered by the Cardwell Farm Inspector.
The LPA’s case is simple: even if there has been a review, the Inspector can
lawfully exercise a planning judgment to consider whether Policy 4(a) remains
up to date, as a result of material changes in circumstances since 2017,
including the change to national policy and the consequent changes on the
ground. That proposition is entirely consistent with Lindblom J in Bloor Homes.
37. It is also consistent with Dove J at paras 42 and 43. In particular:
Moreover, the question of whether or not any change in circumstances is
significant is one which has to be taken on the basis of not only the salient
facts of the case, but also other national and local planning policy
considerations which may be involved. In short, in my view, the language of
the PPG and its proper interpretation did not constrain the Inspector and
preclude her from reaching the conclusion that she did, namely that the
significant difference between the housing requirement in Core Strategy Policy
4(a) and that generated by the standard method was capable of amounting to
a significant change rendering Core Strategy Policy 4(a) out of date.
38. The LPA strongly submit that the Inspector is lawfully entitled to exercise a
planning judgment on whether Policy 4(a) is out of date, as a result of changes
in circumstance since the review. It is submitted that this is an unanswerable
and elementary planning principle. It is not precluded by the wording of NPPF
73 and fn 37 as BP expressly conceded (the LPA’s notes on this are clear).
39. For the purposes of this application, the LPA therefore submit:
(i) This is not an issue addressed (transparently or at all) by the
Cardwell Farm Inspector, who provides no answer to key point (i);
(ii) Accordingly, there is a contested legal proposition at the heart of
point (i).
40. The LPA submits that the Appellant’s legal submissions are flawed. The LPA has
not even arguably misunderstood the judgment of Dove J (ACA 10). Reading
paras 42, 43 and 45 together, it is clear that a planning judgment can be made
and is (in fact) required in this case given the LPA’s evidence. This cannot
reasonably be contested by the Appellant. There is, therefore, a respectable (if
not unanswerable) basis for the LPA’s RFR 1.
41. The second point concerns a planning judgment on which reasonable
disagreement may occur. This cannot be grounds for a cost application.
Previous Decisions
42. The Application is made on the basis that it was unreasonable for the LPA to
continue with RFR 1, once the Cardwell Farm decision was issued. That
proposition fails to establish and (then) engage with the relevant legal
principles concerning previous decisions.
43. This appeal (as a matter of law) falls to be determined on its own merits (not in
accordance with the decision in Cardwell Farm). Applying s.38(6), the appeal
falls to be determined in accordance with the Development Plan, unless
material considerations indicate otherwise. A previous decision letter is capable
of being a material consideration because of the principle of consistency of
administrative decision-making. However, the Cardwell Farm decision is
emphatically not binding on this Inspector. There is no rule that like cases must
be decided alike. On the contrary, a Planning Inspector must always exercise
his/her own judgment and is therefore free to disagree with the planning
judgment of another. However, an Inspector ought to give reasons for
departing with a previous decision, unless it concerns a matter of judgment, in
which case you can simply say: “I disagree” (see North Wiltshire DC v SoSE
[1992] 65 P&CR 34). That is also the basis of Dove J’s decision (ibid).
44. Indeed, the Cardwell Farm Inspector has disagreed with the Pear Tree Lane
Inspector and the First Chain House Lane Inspector as a matter of judgment
and has provided reasons for doing so. It is not even arguably unreasonable for
the LPA to invite this Inspector to do the same.
45. It follows that the Cardwell Farm does not conclusively address the issue of
whether Policy 4(a) is out of date, such that it is unreasonable for the LPA to
present a respectable case on it. The Appellant’s application is legally flawed. It
should fail on this point alone.
The Cardwell Farm DL (AD 1)
46. For the avoidance of doubt, it is not accepted that: “A major part of the
Council’s case has been the importance of determining cases on a consistent
basis”.10 That is a forensic mischaracterisation of the LPA’s case, which has
been made to support its misplaced allegation of unreasonable conduct.
Rather, the major part of the LPA’s case has been that a planning judgment
must be exercised on the issue of whether Policy 4(a) is out of date as a matter
of planning judgment.
47. The LPA drew the Inspector’s attention to this Appeal in its written evidence, as
it is bound to do. The LPA drew the Inspector’s attention to it, when it was
published (see AD 1). This is not (even arguably) unreasonable conduct – quite
the opposite.
10 ACA 8
48. Thereafter, the LPA has presented evidence to explain why it (reasonably)
disagrees with the decision in Cardwell Farm and has provided reasons for this
disagreement (per Wainhomes and North Wilts DC supra). This has been
addressed in the Closing Submission of the LPA (see paragraph 95 - 100). In
essence:
(i) SRBC did not appear at that Inquiry and did not provide
evidence/submissions to it;
(ii) The Cardwell Farm Inquiry evidence is not before this Inspector. It
can be provided if necessary but such evidence is materially different.
The submissions were also materially different;
(iii) There are significant flaws in the decision letter. Having identified
that Preston CC argued that there had been a significant change since
the review in 2017 (DL 32), the Inspector fails to answer it and fails
to reach a planning judgment on whether Policy 4(a) is out of date as
a result. Reading the decision letter fairly and in full, that judgment is
not addressed;
(iv) The Decision Letter is to be challenged by PCC. SRBC agree that it is
legally flawed because inter alia (a) it fails to address whether there
has been a significant change in circumstances which renders Policy
4(a) out of date; and/or (ii) whilst it addresses Ground 1 of
Wainhomes, it fails to take Ground 3 into account and/or address it
(see DL 38, 40 and 41);
(v) If, which is not accepted, such issues have been addressed and taken
into consideration, the reasoning is unlawfully absent. It is simply not
clear what conclusion was reached on this issue and why. It is
therefore unlawful;
(vi) Rather, the Inspector asks (DL 33) and answers (DL 33-40) the
different question of whether there has been a review of a review.
There is, however, no statutory/policy or guidance requirement for
there to be a review of a review before a planning judgment can be
exercised on whether Policy 4(a) is out of date. Policies are routinely
concluded to be out of date without “a robust process” or a review of
a review (DL 33). All that is required is a planning judgment (on
which different conclusions can reasonably be reached).
(vii) The Cardwell Farm DL does not, therefore, provide a complete
answer to the LPA’s evidence and submissions at this Inquiry. On the
contrary it is deeply flawed and reasons have been provided why it
should be followed.
49. Therefore, the LPA has provided a “respectable basis” for reaching a different
planning judgment on the issue of whether Policy 4(a) is out of date. In all the
circumstances, that is not arguably unreasonable. On the contrary, the LPA has
set out robustly and persuasively why this Appeal should fail on RFR 1.
The LPA’s Second Review
50. Further or alternatively, since the Pear Tree Lane Inquiry and in the light of
evidence at this Inquiry and Cardwell Farm, the LPA has undertaken a further
review and concluded that the 5 year supply should be calculated using the
LHN (see AD 10). In cross-examination, BP conceded the position was
materially different. This Appellant is bound by the answers of its professional
witness and the concession was express and clear. The LPA’s notes are all
consistent on this point. Further, the concession is unanswerably correct. As a
matter of fact, PCC have not undertaken such a second review. The decision
required in this Appeal is materially different. It is not, therefore, close to
unreasonable to defend RFR 1. This alone is a complete answer to the cost
application.
51. Of course, the Appellant disputes that this is a “review”. However, that makes
the LPA’s point for it. This is a matter on which there is contested professional
evidence and on which another planning judgment is required. The LPA’s
position (see Closing at para 106) is correct. It is not arguably unreasonable.
52. Indeed, the application (again) departs from its own evidence. BP conceded
that the decision had been robust as a process (cf ACA 10). He nonetheless
argued that it was not a review. That concession cannot reasonably be disputed
as it was read back to the witness. Again, the LPA’s notes are all consistent on
that point. Given that it is common ground that there are no formal
requirements (no formal process requirements), the concession is the only
rational position to adopt. The remaining issue is whether it constitutes a
“review”. Again, given the absence of requirements for the review, the
Appellant cannot reasonably argue that it wasn’t a “robust process” because
the LPA have such a wide measure of discretion in what constitutes its review.
53. In essence, the LPA exercised a planning judgment on the process of the
review (see AD 10 10, 22 and 23). There are no procedural requirements for
that planning judgment, save that it must be proportionate (which is not
contested). There has unanswerably been a review. That is abundantly clear
from AD 10. The Appellant has sought to pick flaws in the review. However,
even at their highest they do not demonstrate that the decision cannot
reasonably be characterised as a review. On that basis, consent should be
refused on RFR 1. Further, the Appellant’s evidence therefore comes nowhere
near demonstrating that the LPA’s reliance on the second review is
unreasonable because of the Cardwell Farm DL. That is an unreasonable
evidential non-sequitur.
54. Finally, Cardwell Farm is based on a claimed lack of clarity over what basis
should found a 5YHLS calculation, as an alternative to MOU 2 (DL 39). There is
no such ambiguity in SRBC. The position is different.
CONCLUSION
55. In all the circumstances, this application is hopeless and must fail.
Further submissions for [APPELLANT] in reply to Council
response
56. The Council’s response to the costs application repeats various arguments
raised in its closing. These matters have been addressed in the Appellant’s
closing statement and the additional comments made in closing. That response
is relied upon and not repeated here. The Council’s response does not provide
grounds for resisting the costs application.
57. The first reason for refusal raises the issue of how the 5 years housing land
supply is to be calculated in accordance with NPPF paragraph 73. Given that it
is accepted that there was a review of the relevant development plan policy in
2017 when it was found to be up to date it is clear from the terms of NPPF
paragraph 73 and footnote 37 that the development plan policy is to be used
for the purposes of calculating the 5 years housing land supply. This is a simple
issue of proper interpretation of the policy which does not involve any exercise
of planning judgment as contended by the Council.
58. There were never any reasonable grounds for doubt on this issue, but if there
had been they were removed by the decision on the Cardwell Farm appeal.
That appeal decision confirms that the 5 years housing land supply should be
calculated in accordance with the clear guidance in NPPF paragraph 73 and
footnote 37. Importantly that decision involves the same development plan
policy and considered the various events since the review in 2017. The findings
in that decision were very clear.
59. The Council’s response relies upon its continued misinterpretation and
misapplication of the previous judicial challenge. As explained at the inquiry the
judgment on Ground 3 was limited to consideration of whether the Inspector
had misinterpreted PPG 61-062. The judgment did not address the application
of this paragraph to any calculation of 5 years housing land supply under NPPF
paragraph 73 because of the concession made (recorded at paragraph 39 of
the judgment). The judgment does not suggest that PPG 61-062 is to be read
as qualifying NPPF paragraph 73 or as introducing a further 2 requirement in
identifying what figure to use for calculating 5 year housing land supply of
considering whether there had been a significant change.
60. The grounds advanced by the Council for distinguishing the Cardwell Farm
decision do not advance the matter any further. The claimed error in the
Cardwell Farm decision relies upon the Council’s misinterpretation of the
previous judicial decision addressed above. The fact that the Council was not
present at the Cardwell Farm inquiry is not relevant. The guidance with respect
to previous decisions is not limited to decisions made between the same
parties. The only claimed difference in circumstances is the claimed subsequent
review (AD 10). It is not a meaningful review and did not involve a robust
process – indeed it appears to have been rushed through for the purposes of
this inquiry. It does not assist the Council.
61. In the circumstances the Council has no answer to the costs application.
Reasons
62. The Cardwell Farm decision was a material consideration in respect of this
appeal. As I highlighted in my appeal decision, that other appeal was allowed,
with the Inspector finding that policy 4(a) of the Core Strategy was not out of
date.
63. The Council explained at the Inquiry that it had considered the Cardwell Farm
decision and disagreed with the judgement of that Inspector, which it was
entitled to do on the matter relating to whether or not policy 4(a) was out of
date. This is particularly in light of the High Court (HC) Judgement concerning
the quashed decision relating to this appeal which was not quashed on the
grounds relating to whether or not policy 4(a) was out of date.
64. In this respect, Mr Justice Dove stated in paragraph 45 of the HC Judgement
his satisfaction that the conclusion the Inspector reached in paragraph 37(iii),
that there had been a significant change pursuant to the PPG arising from the
introduction of the standard method (SM), was a planning judgement
reasonably open to her based upon a correct interpretation of the PPG (albeit
other conclusions might reasonably be reached by other Inspectors), and
therefore she was entitled to conclude that Core Strategy policy 4(a) was out of
date. As such, just as much as other conclusions might reasonably be reached,
the Council was entitled to maintain a case that the policy was out of date in
this regard. In doing so, the Council explained at the Inquiry why it disagreed
with the Cardwell Farm decision and also claimed there to be flaws in that
decision.
65. Consistency in decision making is important. However, that does not prevent
disagreement with a previous decision and differing planning judgements to be
made where the matter is open for such, with explanation provided as to why
that differing stance has been taken. Indeed, having considered all of the
evidence before me, I found in my appeal decision that it is appropriate to
calculate the housing requirement against local housing need (LHN) using the
SM due to the significant difference between the LHN figure and that of
policy 4(a) amounting to a significant change in circumstances which renders
policy 4(a) out of date.
66. The Applicant also refers to the PPG making it clear that examples of
unreasonable conduct leading to an award of costs include persisting with
objections contrary to a previous decision of an Inspector. The Applicant also
highlights that the PPG with respect to previous decisions is not limited to those
made between the same parties. Although I have taken this concern into
consideration, particularly as the list of examples of unreasonable conduct is
not exhaustive, that list does nevertheless refer to the matter of persisting with
objections in terms of those relating to a scheme or elements of a scheme
which the Secretary of State or an Inspector has previously indicated to be
acceptable.
67. In this case, the appeal relates to a different site, scheme and Local Planning
Authority area. Although the issue at hand, concerning whether policy 4(a) is
out of date, was a common consideration, the Council was not persisting with a
stance relating to the same site or proposal within its own area. Furthermore,
the Council did not provide evidence or submissions in respect of the Cardwell
Farm appeal, and the full evidence relating to that other Inquiry was not before
this Inquiry.
68. The costs application submissions include reference to what the Council claims,
for the purposes of paragraph 73 and footnote 37 of the Framework, to be a
review of the figure to be used as the basis for calculating the Council’s housing
land supply when determining planning applications and appeals for housing
schemes. This is in the form of a Record of Executive Member Decision taken
under the Scheme of Delegation dated 8 March 2021 entitled Annual Housing
Requirement. Regardless as to whether or not that document can be
considered to represent such a review, it was a material consideration. It was
therefore reasonable to hear evidence in respect of that document at the
Inquiry.
69. In conclusion, for the above reasons, I find that the Council did not behave
unreasonably in maintaining its position relating to its first reason for refusal
and that, therefore, the Applicant’s costs in pursuing the appeal were not
unnecessarily incurred or wasted. For this reason, neither a full or partial award
of costs is justified.
Andrew Dawe
INSPECTOR


Appeal Decision
Inquiry Held on 16 - 19 March 2021
Site visit made on 25 March 2021
by Andrew Dawe BSc(Hons) MSc MPhil MRTPI
an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State
Decision date: 24th June 2021
Appeal Ref: APP/F2360/W/19/3234070
Land to the South of Chain House Lane, Whitestake, Preston
• The appeal is made under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
against a refusal to grant outline planning permission.
• The appeal is made by [APPELLANT] against the decision of South
Ribble Borough Council.
• The application Ref 07/2018/9316/OUT, dated 4 December 2018, was refused by notice
dated 27 June 2019.
• The development proposed is Outline Planning Permission for up to 100 dwellings with
access and associated works.
• This decision supersedes that issued on 13 December 2019. That decision on the appeal
was quashed by order of the High Court.
Decision
1. The appeal is dismissed.
Application for costs
2. At the Inquiry an application for costs was made by Wainhomes (North West)
Ltd against South Ribble Borough Council. This application is the subject of a
separate Decision.
Procedural Matters
3. For clarity, when considering the previous decision relating to the fifth bullet
point of the above header, I shall refer to it as the quashed decision, and to the
High Court order as the HC Judgement.
4. The site address in the above header is taken from the original planning
application form. This provides sufficient information to describe the location
albeit that reference to it being land to the rear of Oakdene in the Council’s
decision and on the Appeal form provides increased clarity.
5. The appeal relates to an outline planning application with all matters reserved
for future consideration other than access. The matters of appearance,
landscaping, layout and scale would therefore be for future consideration were
the appeal allowed. However, the Appellant has submitted an illustrative
masterplan, to show how the site could be developed. That plan is the
amended version submitted for and considered at the previous Inquiry
(Ref. 1638WHD/CHL/IM01 Revision B) which was accepted in that case by my
colleague, along with an amended access plan (Ref. SCP 18355/FO2 Revision
B), relating to a minor alteration to the access to avoid a tree on the
neighbour’s boundary. I have no basis to consider differently to my colleague
that the amended plans do not substantively alter the proposals, and would not
prejudice the interests of interested parties. I have therefore also accepted
those plans and determined the appeal on that basis.
6. Again, as referred to by my colleague in the quashed decision, the Council has
withdrawn its third reason for refusal relating to air quality following the
submission of an Air Quality Assessment. There remain no differences between
the Council and Appellant on this matter which I have therefore not dealt with
as a main issue, albeit acknowledging that it remains a point of concern for a
number of local residents.
7. Among other appeal decisions submitted and referred to in relation to this
appeal, one relates to Land at Cardwell Farm, Garston Road, Barton, Preston,
Ref APP/N2345/W/20/3258889 (the Cardwell Farm decision). That appeal was
allowed and the decision has been challenged by Preston City Council.
However, that does not change the evidence before me as the decision remains
in place unless it is quashed by order of the High Court. Notwithstanding that
and other decisions referred to, whilst taking them into account, I have
considered this appeal on its own merits based on all of the evidence before
me.
Main Issues
8. The main issues are:
i) the South Ribble Borough Council housing requirement and whether the
Council can demonstrate a five year supply of deliverable housing sites;
and
ii) whether the proposed development would prejudice the Council’s ability
to manage the comprehensive development of the wider area of
safeguarded land within which the appeal site is located, with particular
regard to policy G3 of the South Ribble Local Plan 2015 (the Local Plan).
Reasons
9. Section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 requires regard to be
had to, amongst other things, the provisions of the development plan, so far as
material to the application, and to any other material considerations. Section
38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 states that if regard
is to be had to the development plan for the purpose of any determination to
be made under the planning Acts the determination must be made in
accordance with the plan unless material considerations indicate otherwise. The
National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework) is such a material
consideration.
10. The development plan for the area comprises the Central Lancashire Core
Strategy (Core Strategy), adopted in July 2012, and the Local Plan adopted in
July 2015. The appeal site forms part of a larger area of safeguarded land
referred to in policy G3 of the Local Plan as S3: South of Coote Lane, Chain
House Lane, Farington and as identified on the adopted Policies Map. Policy G3
is the only policy cited in the two remaining reasons for refusal relating to the
Council’s decision. Policy 4 of the Core Strategy is also directly relevant in
relation to the housing requirement and calculation of the five year housing
land supply.
Housing requirement
11. Policy 4 of the Core Strategy sets out the housing requirement for the three
Central Lancashire authorities; Preston, South Ribble and Chorley, which form
one Housing Market Area (HMA). A figure of 417 dwellings per annum (pa) is
specified for South Ribble at part (a) of the Policy, and parts (b) to (d) relate to
the review of housing delivery performance, and ensuring that a five year
supply and sufficient housing land is identified by site allocations.
12. Paragraph 73 of the Framework requires local planning authorities to identify
and update annually a supply of specific deliverable sites sufficient to provide a
minimum of five years’ worth of housing against their housing requirement set
out in adopted strategic policies, or against their local housing need where
those policies are more than five years old. The strategic policies within the
Core Strategy are clearly more than five years old in which case footnote 37 to
paragraph 73 gives the proviso ‘unless these strategic policies have been
reviewed and found not to require updating’. The footnote also states that
where local housing need is used as the basis for assessing whether a five year
supply of specific deliverable sites exists, it should be calculated using the
standard method set out in national planning guidance.
13. The three Central Lancashire authorities entered into a Joint Memorandum of
Understanding and Statement of Co-operation relating to the provision of
Housing Land in September 2017 (MOU1). MOU1 was informed by a Central
Lancashire Strategic Housing Market Assessment dated September 2017
(SHMA). It was agreed in MOU1 that the housing requirements set out in
policy 4 of the Core Strategy should continue to apply until the adoption of a
replacement local plan. This matter related to ground 1 of the HC Judgement.
In this respect, Mr Justice Dove concluded that the Inspector’s reasons for
finding that MOU1 and the SHMA process leading up to it did not properly
constitute a footnote 37 review are not legally adequate, and that her
conclusions are affected by illegality in the form of an error of fact. It is now
common ground between the Council and Appellant that policy 4 of the Core
Strategy was subject to review in 2017 when it was found not to require
updating. I have no substantive basis to consider differently.
14. However, importantly, the previous decision was not quashed in relation to
ground 1. This was due to the points raised under ground 3 representing a
fallback and that the HC Judgement found that the conclusion the Inspector
reached that there had been a significant change pursuant to the Planning
Practice Guidance (PPG)1 arising from the introduction of the standard method
(the SM) in the 2018 Framework, was a planning judgement reasonably open
to her based upon a correct interpretation of the PPG, albeit that other
conclusions might reasonably be reached by other Inspectors. In coming to
that finding, Mr Justice Dove said that “the language of the PPG and its proper
interpretation did not constrain the Inspector and preclude her from reaching
the conclusion that she did, namely that the significant difference between the
housing requirement in Core Strategy policy 4(a) and that generated by the
standard method was capable of amounting to a significant change rendering
Core Strategy policy 4(a) out of date”.
1 Paragraph 062, Reference ID: 61-062-20190315
15. I acknowledge the concern raised by the Appellant that the Framework, and
paragraph 73 in particular, could not have been written with the expectation of
the use of the SM rendering reviewed policies out of date. However, I do not
consider that the introduction of the SM in itself represents a significant change
in circumstances. Rather, the question is whether the outcome of applying the
SM represents a significant change, if it is appropriate to apply the SM in the
first place.
16. In paragraph 34 of the quashed decision, it refers to any effects of
redistribution of housing and how the use of the SM will affect the other two
Central Lancashire authorities, as being a matter for their own decision making
and for the emerging Central Lancashire Local Plan (CLLP) in carrying out a full
review of housing policies. I agree that to be the case.
17. Furthermore, in paragraph 36 of the quashed decision, it states that it is clear
to the Inspector that the direction of travel by all three authorities is towards
the SM and a re-distribution of the housing requirement based on a range of
factors including population, workforce and jobs distribution and constraints
(including Green Belt). This is apparent from a combination of the work relating
to a second Memorandum of Understanding (MOU2), entered into by the three
HMA authorities in April 2020, albeit no longer in place given the withdrawal of
one of the signatories; the March 2020 Central Lancashire Housing Study which
was taken into account in MOU2, even if consideration was not given to
whether or not the housing requirement figure in Core Strategy policy 4 was up
to date or there were grounds for concluding that there had been a significant
change; the Issues and Options Consultation document, November 2019,
relating to the production of the new CLLP; and the Council’s Annual Housing
Requirement report dated 8 March 2021.
18. The use of the SM in producing the emerging CLLP would be consistent with
paragraph 60 of the National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework)
which states, amongst other things that to determine the minimum number of
homes needed, strategic policies should be informed by a local housing need
assessment, conducted using the SM in national planning guidance – unless
exceptional circumstances justify an alternative approach which also reflects
current and future demographic trends and market signals. I therefore also
consider that the direction of travel is towards use of the SM. As such, in this
respect, it is reasonable to consider the implications of the Framework’s
introduction of the SM for the housing requirement in the context of this
appeal.
19. I acknowledge, and agree with my colleagues in their respective appeal
decisions relating to housing schemes at Land at Cardwell Farm referred to
above and Pear Tree Lane, Euxton, Chorley2, that any re-distribution of housing
requirement amongst the Central Lancashire Authorities should not be
conducted through decision making outside of the development plan making
process. However, that does not mean that the application of LHN derived from
using the SM, without any subsequent re-distribution, cannot be considered in
decision-making. This is apparent in those circumstances whereby the SM
would be required to be used under the terms of paragraph 73 and footnote 37
of the Framework to calculate the housing requirement if adopted strategic
2 Appeal decision Ref: APP/D2320/W/20/3247136 dated 11 August 2020
policies are more than five years old and require updating, whether that follows
a review or if no review has been undertaken.
20. In the case of Central Lancashire, notwithstanding the work conducted to
inform the review of the Core Strategy and the MOU2 figures, the emerging
CLLP remains at a relatively early stage in the process towards adoption. There
are therefore no new housing requirement figures that are adopted or close to
adoption through a new development plan with no associated agreement as to
any re-distribution of housing need. I therefore have no substantive basis to
consider it inappropriate to take into consideration that change in the Council’s
housing requirement figure resulting from the application of the SM alone
without any further re-distribution.
21. Paragraph 062 of the PPG states, amongst other things, that where a review
was undertaken prior to publication of the Framework (27 July 2018) but within
the last 5 years, then that plan will continue to constitute the up-to-date plan
policies unless there have been significant changes in circumstances as outlined
later in paragraph 062. In this case MOU1 pre-dated the 2018 Framework and
was clearly within the last 5 years.
22. The PPG states that local housing need will be considered to have changed
significantly where a plan has been adopted prior to the standard method being
implemented, on the basis of a number that is significantly below that
generated using the SM. However, it does not state that to be the only
scenario. The final sentence of paragraph 062 also states that this is to ensure
that all housing need is planned for as quickly as reasonably possible.
23. Reliance on LHN calculated using the SM, rather than on a review similar to
that culminating in MOU1, having regard to the HC Judgement, is therefore
consistent with the PPG and paragraph 33 of the Framework, where a re-
distribution of housing requirement is not being considered. As such, that
reliance would be a reasonable approach, regardless of MOU1 having
comprised a review and whether or not the Council’s Annual Housing
Requirement report dated 8 March 2021 can be considered to be a policy
review for the purposes of paragraph 73 and footnote 37 of the Framework.
24. Fundamentally, with the application of the SM in this case, the housing
requirement figure would be significantly lower, 191 dwellings for South Ribble
as opposed to 417 dwellings in policy 4(a) of the Core Strategy. Paragraph 33
of the Framework, regardless of it not directly referencing the calculation of
housing land supply in respect of paragraph 73 of the Framework, makes it
clear that, amongst other things, relevant strategic policies will need updating
at least once every five years if their applicable local housing need figure has
changed significantly; and they are likely to require earlier review if local
housing need is expected to change significantly in the near future. It does not
define what significant is nor stipulate that this relates solely to where the
figure increases.
25. Although little weight should be afforded to the emerging CLLP due the
relatively early stage it is at towards adoption, the associated Issues and
Options Consultation document nevertheless states that ‘it is likely that the
number of homes we must deliver for this plan period of 2021-2036 will be
different to our existing policy’. That was in the context of having applied the
SM and calculated the minimum number of homes required per year at the
time of producing that document as being 1,033 houses across Central
Lancashire and 213 for South Ribble; albeit that it also states that the three
Councils are still looking into the number of homes needed and how these will
be spread across the three authorities.
26. Notwithstanding the work carried out surrounding MOU2, I also have no
substantive basis, given that relatively early stage towards adoption of the
emerging CLLP, to indicate whether or not any re-distributed figures would still
amount to a significant difference to that in the Core Strategy for South Ribble.
It might be the case that the actual LHN for South Ribble in the emerging CLLP
is greater than the 191 dwellings. However, that is a matter for that plan-
making process, as is consideration of any other factors such those surrounding
the Preston, South Ribble and Lancashire City Deal, and does not diminish the
situation whereby the LHN figure based on the SM represents a significant
change in circumstances at the current time.
27. I acknowledge that such a significant reduction needs to be considered in the
context of the Government’s objective, set out in the Framework, of
significantly boosting the supply of homes. It should also be considered in the
context of the clear need for affordable housing in the Borough. Furthermore, I
have taken account of the other factors set out by my colleague in relation to
the Cardwell Farm decision, those relating to the continued application of Core
Strategy housing requirements at the time of MOU1 remaining relevant today.
He highlighted that MOU1 noted that continuing to apply the Core Strategy
housing requirement would, amongst other things, reflect the spatial pattern of
development set out in Core Strategy policy 1. However, that is not in the
context of applying the SM and does not diminish the circumstances whereby
the introduction of the SM into the Framework since MOU1, designed to achieve
the Government’s objective of significantly boosting the supply of homes, gives
rise to a significant change, albeit a lower figure. Furthermore, it would not in
any case preclude sustainable housing development, including affordable
housing, above the minimum LHN figure.
28. In the Cardwell Farm decision, where my colleague did not find policy 4(a) to
be out of date, he refers to the Council pointing to the introduction of the
standard method for assessing LHN as being a significant change in
circumstances since MOU1. He also refers to the quashed decision relating to
this appeal and the associated HC Judgement. However, the full evidence
presented to my colleague, relating to a different scheme in a different local
planning authority area, is not before me to enable a clear picture of the
background to his decision. That decision focuses consideration on the
application of the SM in the context of MOU2, which he highlights sought to
redistribute the LHN figures across those Central Lancashire Authorities. There
is no attempt to do that in this case whereby the Council seeks to apply the SM
without any redistribution, resulting in what I consider to be a significant
difference in the housing requirement for South Ribble between that in policy
4(a) and that generated by the SM.
29. As referred to above, the Council has submitted what it claims, for the
purposes of paragraph 73 and footnote 37 of the Framework, to be a review of
the figure to be used as the basis for calculating the Council’s housing land
supply when determining planning applications and appeals for housing
schemes. This is in the form of a Record of Executive Member Decision taken
under the Scheme of Delegation dated 8 March 2021 entitled Annual Housing
Requirement. The Appellant disputes whether it can be described as a review.
Even if I were to consider that document not to be a review, it would not alter
my finding in relation to the introduction of the SM resulting in a significant
change in the Council’s housing requirement figure that renders policy 4(a) out
of date. I have therefore not considered the question of whether it constitutes
a footnote 37 review in any further detail.
30. For the above reasons, I conclude that for the purposes of this appeal, it is
appropriate to calculate the housing requirement against LHN using the SM due
to the significant difference between the LHN figure and that of policy 4(a)
amounting to a significant change in circumstances which renders policy 4(a)
out of date.
Housing supply
31. Based on the LHN figure of 191 dwellings per annum, it is common ground
between the parties that the Council would be able to demonstrate between
10.1 and 12.7 years’ worth of supply of deliverable housing sites. That
difference arises due to the dispute between the Council and Appellant over the
windfall allowance and the deliverability of two sites within the five year period.
It represents the range from that of the Appellant’s position to that of the
Council’s. Even if I were to accept the lower figure this would still represent a
supply well in excess of the minimum five years’ worth required by the
Framework. Therefore, whilst having considered the evidence relating to those
disputed elements, the weight afforded to either end of the above supply range
would not be significantly different. As such, I have not dealt with this
particular matter in any further detail.
Safeguarded land
32. Policy G3 of the Local Plan, in setting out areas of safeguarded land, states that
such land is not designated for any specific purpose within the Plan period. It
goes on to state that existing uses will for the most part remain undisturbed
during the Plan period or until the Plan is reviewed. The supporting text to that
policy explains, amongst other things, that the presumption against built
development on these safeguarded land sites will assist in directing
development towards those areas allocated for development and also ensuring
the permanence of the Green Belt.
33. Further to the High Court Judgement, it is agreed by the Council and Appellant
that policy G3 is out of date in the scenario whereby the housing requirement
is derived from the application of the SM, and I have no substantive basis to
consider differently. This is due to the consequences upon, and the stark
difference in, the housing distribution within the Central Lancashire Authorities,
as referred to in the HC Judgement and was the only reason that the previous
decision was quashed. It calls into question the existing quantity and
distribution of safeguarded land, albeit that these would be matters for detailed
consideration and analysis in the plan-making process rather than for this
decision.
34. Nevertheless, even though policy G3 is out of date that does not mean it
should be disapplied, but rather is a factor in the weight afforded it in the
planning balance. Furthermore, it is a policy that remains consistent with the
Framework which in paragraph 139 sets out that when defining Green Belt
boundaries, plans should, amongst other things, where necessary, identify
areas of safeguarded land between the urban area and the Green Belt, in order
to meet longer-term development needs stretching well beyond the plan
period; and make clear that safeguarded land is not allocated for development
at the present time. Paragraph 139(d) goes onto state that planning permission
for the permanent development of safeguarded land should only be granted
following an update to a plan which proposes the development.
35. Although the proposed development would occupy only a relatively small part
of area S3, it would still be a major form of development. The supporting text
to policy G3 clarifies that some appropriate minor residential development
adjacent to other properties would be considered. I, like my colleague in the
quashed decision, do not consider the proposed scheme for up to 100 dwellings
to represent minor residential development. As such, it would not be of a
sufficiently small scale to be construed as ensuring that existing uses on the
safeguarded land would for the most part remain undisturbed.
36. Notwithstanding any other material considerations relating to policy G3 being
out of date, the proposed development would be contrary to that first element
of policy G3 referred to above. Furthermore, as I have found that the Council
has a minimum of 10.1 years’ worth of supply of deliverable housing sites, this
would not put pressure on this safeguarded land to be developed now to meet
an unmet need.
37. Policy G3 of the Local Plan goes on to state further that planning permission
will not be granted for development which would prejudice potential longer
term, comprehensive development of the land.
38. The submitted illustrative masterplan shows how vehicular and pedestrian
access could be provided to adjoining land owned by Homes England.
Furthermore, a joint illustrative masterplan prepared by the Appellant and
Homes England, relating to the wider area of land comprising the site and that
adjoining land, shows how access could be provided comprehensively to and
between both sites. Unencumbered and unfettered access from the appeal site
to the Homes England land could also be secured by a condition.
39. I acknowledge that this joint masterplan has not been submitted in connection
with a planning application for that wider area of land comprising the two sites
and that, as such, no formal consultation has been undertaken. Nevertheless, it
does give an indication as to how the proposed development could be
implemented without prejudicing development of that adjacent land.
Furthermore, I acknowledge that the majority of the remaining part of S3, the
land south of Coote Lane, is physically separated from the site by Church Lane
and the railway line and thereby unlikely to be prejudiced in terms of access
and so could be developed independently.
40. This corresponds with the examining Inspector in her Report dated 9 June 2015
on the examination into the site allocations and development management
policies development plan document, where she referred to the site and land to
the east, also in S3, as being physically separate parcels of land and that it
would no doubt be possible for them to be developed in isolation. She does
however go on to say that one of the benefits of promoting a comprehensive
development of the larger allocated and safeguarded sites is that they would
provide the opportunity to plan to meet the need for essential infrastructure
improvements. She goes on to say that piecemeal development of smaller
parcels of land within the overall site allocation is unlikely to provide the same
opportunity.
41. Furthermore, section 12 of the Framework relates to achieving well-designed
places and my colleague, in the quashed decision, referred to the implications
of piecemeal development of the S3 area as a whole. It was highlighted that
there was no evidence to suggest that 100 dwellings alone would warrant
contributions to, for example, local education provision and a nearby railway
crossing at the present time or that such contributions would meet the tests in
paragraph 56 of the Framework. I agree with this position and that the
development of S3 as a whole may require local infrastructure improvements
to properly support it in the interests of effective placemaking and efficient
infrastructure delivery.
42. There would be a risk of missing the opportunity to achieve such effective
placemaking and efficient infrastructure delivery if piecemeal developments
such as that proposed come forward without the umbrella of an overall
masterplan approach for S3. Such a masterplan approach would be consistent
with the Government’s objectives in section 12 of the Framework to achieve
well-designed places, including engagement with local communities and setting
out a clear design vision and expectations, a finding by my colleague in the
quashed decision which I have no substantive basis to disagree with. The
submitted joint masterplan by the Appellant and Homes England, despite
demonstrating how those particular two parts of S3 may interact in access
terms in particular, does not clearly address any likely need for wider
infrastructure provision.
43. I acknowledge that the proposals include provision for financial contributions
towards local bus service improvements; to improve, enhance and maintain
cycle parking at Lostock Hall train station; and towards improvements to off-
site playing pitch and play space; together with provision for on-site public
open space. However, that would all be tailored to the requirements of the
proposed development and not to how infrastructure might be more
appropriately provided for the overall development of the S3 area.
44. With regard to comprehensive development of the S3 area, my colleague in the
previous decision also highlighted concerns raised about the extent of the
distance from the existing urban area and that the proposed development
would be on a pocket of safeguarded land in isolation.
45. In this respect I note that the site would be approximately 1.6 kilometres from
Lostock Hall which is the nearest destination for a good range of shops and
services to serve the day to day needs of prospective residents as well as the
rail station. There is footway access alongside the intervening fairly direct
roads. However, the distance involved, whilst within walking and cycling
distance for some people, would be unlikely to encourage significant numbers
to do so on a regular basis. Furthermore, as also highlighted by the previous
Inspector, comments received from interested parties raised issues regarding
the narrow roads and inadequate footways, the slope of the railway bridges
and feeling unsafe when cycling. I agree that such concerns add some weight
to the point about the likely degree of walking and cycling to Lostock Hall,
albeit limited in the absence of substantive evidence to demonstrate that the
proposed development would pose a risk to highway and pedestrian safety.
46. In terms of good place-making, for the above reasons, were the S3 land to be
developed, an overall masterplan approach would give the opportunity to
ensure the part nearest to the urban area, the land south of Coote Lane, could
be developed first or at least allow careful consideration to be given to
appropriate phasing of development.
47. I acknowledge that the development of the allocated Pickerings Farm site on
the opposite side of Chain House Lane from the site would result in a
significantly altered pattern of development in the locality whereby it is
currently characterised by a largely ribbon form of development alongside
Chain House Lane. However, that land opposite remains undeveloped and the
proposed development alone, in the absence of that allocated development or
other development on nearby safeguarded land, including within S3, would
stand out as an uncharacteristic and disconnected form of development in that
existing local context.
48. For the above reasons, the proposed development would be contrary to policy
G3 of the Local Plan both in terms of that policy’s requirement that existing
uses will for the most part remain undisturbed during the Plan period or until
the Plan is reviewed, and in prejudicing potential longer term comprehensive
development of the wider area of safeguarded land within which the appeal site
is located. In respect of this issue, the proposed development would also be
contrary to paragraph 139 and section 12 of the Framework.
49. I will consider this issue further in the planning balance, including in relation to
policy G3 being out of date having regard to the deployment of the SM in
calculating LHN and the consequences for the distribution of housing.
Planning balance
50. With regard to paragraph 11(d) of the Framework, the policies which are most
important for determining the application are Core Strategy policy 4 and policy
G3 of the Local Plan. I have found that Policy G3 and the element of policy 4
comprising paragraph 4(a) are out-of-date for the reasons given in my
consideration of the main issues. The tilted balance set out in paragraph 11(d)ii
of the Framework therefore applies.
51. I have also set out that the reasons for policy G3 being out of date calls into
question the existing quantity and distribution of safeguarded land. However, I
have found that the proposed development would be contrary to policy G3 and
it remains the case that such extent and distribution of safeguarded land would
be matters for detailed consideration and analysis in the plan-making process
rather than for this decision. Furthermore, and importantly, I have found that
the Council can demonstrate at least 10.1 years’ worth of supply of deliverable
housing sites against its requirement to provide a minimum of 5 years’ supply.
52. There is therefore currently no substantive basis to consider that the site
should be disregarded as safeguarded land and there is no housing need
requirement to justify its development now. As such, whilst full weight cannot
be afforded to policy G3 for the reasons relating to it being out of date, it
should still be afforded significant weight.
53. Having regard to the Government’s objective of significantly boosting the
supply of homes, the proposed development comprising upto 100 dwellings,
and with the potential to progress without unnecessary delay, would be a
benefit in this respect. This would include the social benefit of providing 30% of
those homes as needed affordable housing. However, given that the Council
can demonstrate a supply of deliverable housing sites well in excess of the
minimum 5 year requirement, this significantly reduces the weight attached to
such benefits.
54. As identified by my colleague in the quashed decision, the proposed
development would have potential local economic benefits arising from
construction jobs and support to construction related businesses; additional
spending by prospective residents; the payment of the New Homes Bonus and
additional Council Tax revenue. Provision of on-site public open space would
also have the potential to benefit existing local residents as well as prospective
occupiers. However, private amenity space, in the absence of any substantive
evidence that it would be anything significantly more than that required to
provide an acceptable living environment for prospective residents, would be
unlikely to have wider benefit. Furthermore, I do not consider it likely that any
new landscaping would necessarily be anything other than a neutral factor
given that it would be in association with the proposed development which
would represent a distinct change to the current open countryside character of
the site.
55. Proposed financial contributions towards bus transport improvements, cycle
parking at Lostock Hall train station, and improvements to off-site playing pitch
and play space would have the potential to benefit existing local residents.
However, such provision would fundamentally mitigate the effects of the
proposed additional housing, thereby attracting little weight.
56. I note that the Cardwell Farm appeal was allowed following the application of
the tilted balance. However, in that case, where there was also some limited
harm to the character and appearance of the area, it was on the basis of there
not being a 5 year HLS, unlike in this case, and it did not involve the issue of
safeguarded land. The circumstances are therefore different, and I have in any
case determined this appeal on its own merits.
57. For the above reasons, in light of my finding that significant weight should
continue to be afforded to policy G3 despite being out of date, the proposed
development’s conflict with the site being within safeguarded land and the
unacceptable harm that would be caused in terms of prejudicing potential
longer term comprehensive development of the wider area of safeguarded land
within which the appeal site is located, would significantly and demonstrably
outweigh the benefits identified, when assessed against the policies in the
Framework taken as a whole.
Conclusion
58. For the above reasons, I conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.
Andrew Dawe
INSPECTOR
APPEARANCES
FOR THE LOCAL PLANNING AUTHORITY:
Giles Cannock QC Instructed by Tasneem Safdar of
South Ribble Borough Council
He called:
Greg Boyd BSc (Hons) MRTPI Senior Planner, Strategic Planning
Team, Iceni Projects Limited
Nick Ireland BA (Hons) MTPl MRTPI Director, Strategic Planning Team,
Iceni Projects Limited
FOR THE APPELLANT:
Vincent Fraser QC Instructed by Stephen Harris of
Emery Planning
He called:
Ben Pycroft BA (Hons) Dip TP MRTPI Director, Emery Planning
Stephen Harris BSc (Hons) MRTPI Director, Emery Planning
INTERESTED PERSONS:
Councillor Karen Walton South Ribble Borough Council Ward
Councillor for Farington West
Jean Berry Local resident and on behalf of Say
No to Chainhouse Lane Development
Councillor Elaine Robb Parish Councillor for Farington and
local resident
Michael Collison Local resident
Alan Pemberton Local resident
INQUIRY DOCUMENTS:
1. Appellant’s opening statement.
2. Opening submissions of the LPA.
3. Copy of notes of verbal presentations by interested parties, made on
16/03/21 unless indicated otherwise, as follows:
3.1. Councillor Karen Walton
3.2. Jean Berry
3.3. Councillor Elaine Robb
3.4. Michael Collison (together with copies of photographs) on 17/03/21
3.5. Alan Pemberton on 17/03/21
4. Email from Jean Berry dated 17/03/21 concerning the Inquiry site visit.
5. Extract from South Ribble Borough Council Constitution dated February
2021, submitted by the Council.
6. Copy of email from the Council dated 18/03/21 concerning the timeline
leading to the Record of Executive Member Decision Taken Under the
Scheme of Delegation, dated 8 March 2021, titled Annual Housing
Requirement.
7. Email from Appellant dated 18/03/21 concerning arrangements for
unaccompanied site visit.
8. Email from Council dated 19/03/21 providing update concerning the land at
Belle Field Close, Penwortham, site at Leyland Road, land off Claytongate
Drive (Site CC), confirming that the County Council exchanged contracts for
the sale of this land for residential development on 18/03/21 and that the
developers are now under a contractual obligation to submit a planning
application.
9. Copies of Central Lancashire Design Guide and Open Space and Playing
Pitch Supplementary Planning Documents.
10. Email from Appellant dated 19/03/21 appending copies of plans referred to
in suggested conditions 6 and 22, together with a reworded condition to
replace suggested conditions 22 and 23, and also appending an email from
the highway authority dated 13/11/19 concerning a recorded accident on
7/10/16 around 1 mile west of the site.
11. Copy of email from Preston City Council dated 18/03/21 expressing its
intention to challenge the Appeal decision for Land at Cardwell Farm
Ref. APP/N2345/W/20/3258889.
12. Email from Appellant dated 19/03/21 relating to Pickerings Farm, clarifying
that evidence presented was that the masterplan includes the S2 land, not
the current application, and that the application deals with EE only.
13. Costs application on behalf of [APPELLANT].
14. Closing submissions of the LPA.
15. Appellant’s Closing Statement.